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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
oooOooo
HEIDA L. THURLOW,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

:
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:

PARK CITY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah,

:

Case NO. 890152-CA
:
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:
oooOooo

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS WHETHER PARK
CITY'S ACTIONS WERE IN EXCESS OF ITS AUTHORITY OR CONTRARY TO
LAW.
The standard of review applicable to this matter is
dictated by whether the questions at issue are factual or legal
in nature.

Park City argues that its decision to approve the

project must stand unless found arbitrary and capricious. The
arbitrary and capricious review standard applies in the context
of factual disputes.
interpretation

The present dispute

involves the

of the Park City Land Management

question of law.

Code, a

In this context, questions such as whether

Park

City's

approval

was arbitrary

or capricious

are not

pertinent.1

In Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents,2 the Utah Supreme
Court expressly adopted the "legal basis" review standard. In
identifying

the proper

focus

of appellate

review

of an

administrative agency decision, the Court sanctioned reversal
in cases where the administrative agency "has in some way acted
contrary to law or in excess of its authority."3
The cases cited by Park City in support of its contention
that arbitrary

and capricious

is the only

review

standard

available to this Court all involve situations where fact-based
agency decisions are challenged.

In Cottonwood

Heights

v.

Board of Commissioners,A the County Commission issued a permit
to construct a 2 00-unit apartment complex. Plaintiff contended
that the approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious
for two reasons.

First, the Commission had denied a similar

application from a different applicant five months earlier, and
no substantial change of circumstances had occurred.

x

Second,

Arguably,
Park
City's
actions
are arbitrary and
capricious since they are contrary to Code which authorizes the
actions.
This need not be decided because, as argued, the
Court has another basis for reversing the actions.
2

595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979).

3

Jd. at 1302.

A

593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979).
2

the Commission failed to gather all pertinent information from
all possible sources.
Unlike the present matter, there was no question in
Cottonwood

Heights

concerning whether the agency's actions were

contrary to any ordinance or statute.
factual in nature:

The questions were

(1) whether there was a substantial change

in circumstances; and (2) whether all pertinent information had
been gathered.

Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious

review standard was appropriate.
Likewise, in Davis

County

v.

Clearfield

City,5

Plaintiff

contended that Clearfield City's denial of a permit was without
substantial basis in fact.

The trial court agreed and found

that the city's actions were arbitrary and capricious.

On

review, this Court also found that the reasons supporting the
city's denial were arbitrary and capricious because they were
without sufficient factual basis.
Finally, Park City cites Xanthos

v.

Board

of

Adjustment,6

for the proposition that the trial court may not substitute its
judgment for a Board of Adjustment. Again, the questions were
essentially

factual.

The Board of Adjustment found that

Xanthos failed to show special circumstances warranting a

5

758 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988).

6

685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984).
3

variance.

The trial court found that the circumstances shown

by Xanthos were sufficient as a matter of public policy and,
thereby, substituted its judgment for that of the Board.

The

Supreme Court reversed, noting that the trial court improperly
disregarded the Board's finding of fact and substituted its
own.
Thurlow does not dispute Park City's contention that
arbitrary and capricious is the correct standard for review of
an agency's fact-based findings.

Agency interpretations of

law, however, are subject to a more exacting standard. As the
Utah Supreme Court indicated in Petty

v. Board of Regents,

the

appropriate inquiry is whether the agency action is contrary
to law or in excess of its authority.

POINT

II:

PARK

CITY'S

APPROVAL

OF

THE

PROJECT

IS NOT

CONDITIONED ON THE DEVELOPER MEETING THE SIXTY PERCENT OPEN
SPACE REQUIREMENT.
Park City acknowledges that the project, as approved, does
not meet the open space requirement found at §10.9 (h) (3) of the
Land Management Code.7

In response to Thurlow!s argument that

the project approval should be reversed on this basis, Park
City makes two arguments.

First, Park City states that "the

7

See Brief of Appellant at A-2 for a copy of the relevant
section.
4

approval by Park City is conditional on the final site plans
submitted and the actual project meeting the sixty percent open
space requirement."8

The minutes from the Park City Planning

Commission meeting at which the project was approved show three
conditions to the approval, none of which mention the open
space requirement:
(1)

City engineer approval
grading, drainage, and
plans;

(2)

Approval by the city landscape
architect of a conceptual landscape
plan, and posting of security to
guarantee
installation
of all
public
improvements
and
landscaping;

(3)

Fire marshall
project.9

approval

of all
utility

of

the

In connection with this argument, Park City states "that
the final plans have not been submitted as of yet to Park
City."10

Whether the plans approved by Park City as a part of

the overall project approval are final is not disclosed in the
record.

Park City raises this issue for the first time in its

brief.

Resolution of the issue is not necessary, however,

because

Park

City

approved

the

project

in

its

present

Brief of Respondent at 9.
9

Minutes of the June 22, 1988,
Commission meeting at 12 (R. 60).
10

Brief of Respondent at 10.

5

Park

City

Planning

configuration, a configuration that fails to meet the statutory
open space requirement.

Whether the developer will cure the

deficiency at some later date is irrelevant.

Park City's

approval of the project is contrary to the requirements of the
Land Management Code and, therefore, the approval must be
reversed.

POINT III: THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PROJECT MEETS THE OPEN
SPACE REQUIREMENTS WAS PROPERLY RAISED AND PUT AT ISSUE.
Park City argues that Thurlow failed to properly allege
and put at issue the open space question.11

Admittedly, the

question is not raised in Thurlow's Amended Complaint.

It was

briefed and argued to the trial court, however, and Park City
has no basis for objection to its consideration on appeal.
Thurlow first raised the issue in support of her Motion
for Summary Judgment.12
opposing memorandum.13

Park City addressed the issue in its
Park City argued that the project meets

11

Brief of Respondent at 3 and 9.

12

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
4 (R. 37).
13

Memorandum in Support of Park City's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3, 4, and 7 (R. 130, 131, and 134).
6

the open space requirements and, in support, supplied copies
of a portion of the project's plans.14
Thurlow

again

addressed

the

issue

in

her

reply

memorandum,15 then argued the point at the hearing on the crossmotions for summary judgment.16 At no time did Park City object
to the trial court's consideration of the issue.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides that when
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the implied
consent of the parties, the issues are treated as if they were
raised in the pleadings.

Amendment to the pleadings may be

allowed to raise these issues, but failure to amend does not
affect the result.
Although Thurlow did not raise the open space issue in her
initial pleading, she did raise it in the pleadings supporting
her Motion for Summary Judgment.

The issue was tried without

objection and, therefore, with the implied consent of the
parties.

Pursuant to Rule 15, Park City may not now object to

its consideration.

^R. 146.
15

Memorandum in Reply to Park City's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Park City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at
2-3 (R. 148-149).
16

Reporter's transcript at 2-3.
7

POINT IV:

PARK CITY'S ARGUMENT REGARDING "CLUSTERING" DOES

NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER FOURPLEXES ARE A PROHIBITED
USE.
Park City argues at length in support of its contention
that

the

Land

Management

Code

allows

"clustering"

of

structures.

The contention itself is correct, but it does

nothing

refute

to

the

fact

that

the

project

contains

fourplexes, a prohibited use in the HR-1 zone.
Park City!s justification for approving the project with
fourplexes is that the Code's prohibition does not apply when
the fourplex is part of a MPD.

Apparently, the argument is

that since MPD's are allowed as a conditional use in the HR-1
zone, and fourplexes may be incorporated into a MPD, fourplexes
must be permitted in the HR-1 zone.17
The problem with this reasoning is that it ignores and is
contrary to the express language of the Land Management Code.
Section 10.9 of the Code states that a use, such as a fourplex,
is permitted as a part of a MPD only

if it is permitted in the

zoning district in which the MPD is located.18
Furthermore, the Land Management Code contemplates the
very situation advocated by Park City. The land use table that

17

Brief of Respondent at 11.

18

Section 10.9 is quoted and discussed at more length in
the Brief of Appellant at 13.
8

describes the permitted, conditional, and prohibited uses in
each zone contains the notation

f, 1|f

c

in every block where the

Code allows a use "within the zone only as a part of a [MPD],
and not as an isolated

land use."19

In other words, if

fourplexes were allowed in the HR-1 zone as a part of a MPD,
as Park City argues, the Notation

lf lfl

c

would appear in the

block corresponding to fourplexes in the HR-1 zone.
the notation does not appear

Because

in the block20, the use is

prohibited and Park City's approval of the project is contrary
to the Code.

POINT V:

APPLICATION OP THE UNIT EQUIVALENT

FORMULA TO

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PERMITTED UNITS INCREASES DENSITY.
Section 10.9(b) of the Land Management Code provides as
follows:
Maximum
Density
Requirements.
The
requirements of Section 7 (Use Tables)
regarding maximum densities shall apply to
all [MPD's] . . . .21
The Use Tables set the maximum density allowed in the HR-1 zone
at one single family dwelling unit on each 1,875 square feet

19

Reference Note 1 to the Land Use Tables, copies of which
are attached to the Brief of Appellant at A-4 and A-5. (R.
158, 159.)
20

Id.

21

Brief of Respondent at A-l (R. 109) .
9

of vacant land.22
vacant

land.

The project contains 28,875 square feet of
Accordingly,

the maximum

number

of

units

authorized by the Code is 15.4.23
Despite this maximum, Park City approved the project with
3 6 units, or one on every 802 square feet of vacant land.
Presumably, Park City approved this increase in density under
the only exception to maximum density provided in the Code,
found at §10.9(b):
Maximum
Density
Requirements.
The
requirements of Section 7 (Use Tables)
regarding maximum densities shall apply to
all [MPDfs] except
that the approving
agency may increase the number of permitted
units to the maximum bonus levels found in
this chapter if it finds that the site plan
contains areas allocated for usable open
space in a common park area as authorized
in this section, or that an increase in
density is warranted by the design and
amenities incorporated in the master
planned development site plan, and the
needs of the residents for usable open
space can be met.24
The §10.9(b) exception under which Park City was entitled to
"increase the number of permitted units11 is conditioned on one
of two findings being made by the reviewing agency.

22

Brief of Appellant at A-8, 9 (R. Ill, 102).

23

28,875 total square feet divided by 1,875 square feet per
unit equals 15.4 units.
24

Brief of Appellant at A-l (R. 109).

In response to Thurlow's position that Park City failed
to make the required

findings, Park City argued that no

increase in density was allowed.25

Park City acknowledges,

however, that the project is approved with more than one unit
for every 1,875 square feet.

Therefore, Park City's position

is untenable. An increase in the number of permitted units was
allowed and, as previously noted, the required findings were
not made.
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Thurlow's
initial brief, the trial court's judgment should be reversed
and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Thurlow.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~2sO

day of July, 1989.

r

L^

Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

25

Brief of Respondent at 13-14.
11
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